Despite significant efforts to support those bereaved by intrauterine death, they remain susceptible to avoidable psychological harm such as disenfranchised grief, misplaced guilt, and emotional shock. This is in part because the words available to describe intrauterine death—“miscarriage,” “spontaneous abortion,” and “pregnancy loss”—are referentially ambiguous. Despite appearing to refer to one event, they can refer to two distinct events: the baby’s death and his preterm delivery. Disenfranchised grief increases when people understand “miscarriage” as the physical process of preterm delivery alone, (...) for this obscures the baby’s death and excludes non-gestational parents, such as the father. Additionally, focusing on the delivery reinforces the mistaken idea that a gestational mother bears responsibility for her baby’s death, increasing misplaced guilt. When these terms instead shift the focus to the baby’s intrauterine death rather than the preterm delivery, they can obscure the physically difficult and often traumatic experience women have when they deliver their dead children, leaving women shocked by preterm delivery’s physical reality. Given their outsized role in framing the bereaved’s experiences, and their duty to avoid harming their patients, healthcare practitioners in particular should take special care to discuss intrauterine death and preterm delivery appropriately with patients and their families. Changing language to describe intrauterine death and preterm delivery clearly and precisely helps mitigate disenfranchised grief, misplaced guilt, and shock, while also helping to reframe the social response to intrauterine death, making it more obvious why certain steps, such as allowing bereavement leave following an intrauterine death, promote healing. (shrink)

Recent publications debate the value of inconsistency arguments. Here, I argue that 'Cause of Death Arguments' - inconsistency arguments that claim miscarriage causes death far more often than induced abortion - are unsound or invalid. 'Miscarriage' ambiguously refers both to intrauterine death, an outcome that does not itself cause death, and preterm delivery, which only sometimes causes death. The referential ambiguity also obscures actions people do take to prevent 'miscarriage.' When using the most plausible versions of each premise, these arguments (...) equivocate. Thus, they cannot prove anything. However, missing the equivocation also causes those responding to Cause of Death Arguments to make unconvincing arguments; they inadvertently make or grant false claims themselves. To avoid such mistakes and expose the merely rhetorical power of Cause of Death Arguments, philosophers should replace 'miscarriage' with disambiguated terms. Doing so should lead people across the abortion debate to finally abandon the Cause of Death Argument. (shrink)

Responsible AI (RAI) guidelines aim to ensure that AI systems respect democratic values. While a step in the right direction, they currently fail to impact practice. Our work discusses reasons for this lack of impact and clusters them into five areas: (1) the abstract nature of RAI guidelines, (2) the problem of selecting and reconciling values, (3) the difficulty of operationalising RAI success metrics, (4) the fragmentation of the AI pipeline, and (5) the lack of internal advocacy and accountability. Afterwards, (...) we introduce a number of approaches to RAI from a range of disciplines, exploring their potential as solutions to the identified challenges. We anchor these solutions in practice through concrete examples, bridging the gap between the theoretical considerations of RAI and on-the-ground processes that currently shape how AI systems are built. Our work considers the socio-technical nature of RAI limitations and the resulting necessity of producing socio-technical solutions. (shrink)

In this paper, I provide an argument for pannormism, the view according to which there are normative properties all the way down. In particular, I argue for what I call the trickling down principle, which says that if there is a metaphysically basic normative property, then, if whatever instantiates it has a ground, that ground instantiates it as well.

I first explore the notion of the world's being such that everything in it is a proper part. I then explore the notion of the world's being such that everything in it both is and has a proper part. Given two well recognized assumptions, I argue that both notions represent genuine metaphysical possibilities. Finally I consider, but dismiss, some possible objections.

In this work I first develop, motivate, and defend the view that mereological composition, the relation between an object and all its parts collectively, is a relation of identity. I argue that this view implies and hence can explain the logical necessity of classical mereology, the formal study of the part-whole relation. I then critically discuss four contemporary views of the same kind. Finally, I employ my thesis in a recent discussion of whether the world is fundamentally one in number.

(No abstract is available for this citation).

In this paper I argue that we need to take irreducibly plural logic more seriously in metaphysical debates due to the fact that the verdict of many metaphysical debates hangs on it. I give two examples. The main example I focus on is the debate recently revived by Jonathan Schaffer over the fundamental cardinality of the world. I show how the three main arguments provided by Schaffer are unsound in virtue of an employment of plural logic. The second example I (...) give is a more general issue about the possibility of emergent properties of mereological wholes. Employing plural logic there is a new way to understand such cases. The upshot is that plural logic greatly matters to metaphysics and hence can no longer be ignored the way it has in this area. (shrink)

Many metaphysicians accept the view that, necessarily, any collection of things composes some further thing. Necessarily, my arms, legs, head, and torso compose my body; necessarily, my arms, my heart, and the table compose something y; necessarily, my heart and the sun compose something z; and so on. 1 Though there have been a few recent attempts to argue against the necessity of this principle of unrestricted composition the consensus is that if it is true, it is necessarily true. 2In (...) what follows I will join the few dissenters and argue that this principle of unrestricted composition is not necessarily true. If I am right, it follows that either some principle of restricted composition is necessarily true or the existence of composite objects is a contingent matter. I will end by indicating why the latter option seems the most plausible. 3I proceed by reductio. Assume the following: Unrestricted composition is necessarily true.That is, assume that necessarily, any collection of things composes something. Then, necessarily, the collection of everything composes something. That is, necessarily, there exists a universal object U having all things as parts, not itself being a proper part of anything. Hence, by our assumption, we get: There must be a universal object U.It is important to note that this is so whether the world is finite or infinite. Holding that in worlds of finite cardinality there is a universal object U while in worlds of infinite cardinality there is no universal object U amounts to accepting a restricted form of composition. 4Now consider the following scenario. Everything in this world is spatially extended and just one half of something else that is also spatially extended. That is, for any thing in this world, there is something else of which …. (shrink)

The focus on deliberation as a central principle represents a common denominator between republican and deliberative theories of democracy (White, 2008, p. 9f). Both proponents of the ‘deliberative...

I show that a particular version of Hume's Dictum together with the falsity of Composition as Identity entails an incoherency, so either that version of Hume's Dictum is false or Composition as Identity is true. I conditionally defend the particular version of Hume's Dictum in play, and hence conditionally conclude that Composition as Identity is true. I end by suggesting an alternative way out for a persistent foe of Composition as Identity, namely mereological nihilism.

What is human nature? How is language related to thought -- and should the connection be investigated socially or scientifically? Is external reality coherent or fragmented? What are the foundations of rationality, and how trustworthy are they? Such questions have bedevilled thinkers for millennia. Contemporary scholars have harnessed enormous resources to find answers, yet their inquiry is invariably constrained by the tunnel vision of academic specialisation. This issue of The Dolphin seeks to establish common ground among the disciplines examining the (...) mind-brain continuum. Among those meeting the editors' challenge to think outside the disciplinary box are Noam Chomsky, John Searle and Steven Pinker, as well as a dozen others from the fields of neuroscience, linguistics, philosophy, cognitive science, English, computer science and ethnography. The implicit framework that results should help researchers in all fields locate the diversity of human knowing within a joint ontological perspective. (shrink)

In this paper I argue that composition as identity entails unrestricted composition. I also briefly consider a new take on the special composition question.

The Anselmian Thesis is the thesis that God is that than which nothing greater can be thought. In this paper, I argue that such a notion of God is incoherent due to greatness being indefinitely extensible: roughly, for any great being that can be, there is another one that is greater, so there cannot be a being than which nothing greater can be. Someone will say that it is impossible to produce the best, because there is no perfect creature, and (...) that it is always possible to produce one which would be more perfect.’ G.W. Leibniz. Theodicy. Edited by A. Farrer (Chicago, IL: Open Court, 1985. Pp. 249.). (shrink)

I develop and defend a version of panpsychism that avoids the combination problem by appealing to plural collective properties.

Roughly, the problem of the Trinity is the problem of how God can be one and yet be the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, which are three, not one. That one thing is identical with three distinct things seems to violate traditional laws of identity. I propose a solution to this problem according to which it is just an ordinary claim of one-many identity. For example, one pair of shoes is identical with two shoes; and my one body (...) is identical with its six limbs of arms, legs, head, and torso. The pair of shoes is not identical with each one of the two shoes, nor is my body identical with each one of its six limbs, but rather identical with all of them taken together, or collectively. I argue that the problem of the Trinity should be understood accordingly: God is identical with the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit collectively, but not with each one of them distributively. According to the way I develop this proposal, no traditional laws of identity are violated, but merely generalized in an intuitive way. I argue that this is compatible with Christian Orthodoxy as given by the Athanasian Creed. I end by responding to some anticipated objections. (shrink)

While the pacification of the world with reference to the Kantian right of freedom prevails politically, the philosophical discussion of the project appears stale and inconclusive. It remains difficult to determine whether and how world peace might be possible on a Kantian basis. Philosophical cosmopolitanism currently suffers from a troublesome aporia. In this state of indeterminacy, the reflections of this paper point to a number of questionable political impulses at the systematic core of the Kantian peace argument, which are implicated (...) in the absolute human right to freedom and may be unintended. (shrink)

I argue that Composition as Identity blocks the plural version of Cantor's Theorem, and that therefore the plural version of Cantor's Theorem can no longer be uncritically appealed to. As an example, I show how this result blocks a recent argument by Hawthorne and Uzquiano.

Divine necessity is the thesis that God must exist. In this paper, I give a brief survey of what the thesis is more exactly, the main arguments for it, and the main arguments against it.

Five days before his twenty-first birthday, Guillaume Apollinaire set out on an automobile trip that would in large part determine his future. Together with the Viscountess Elinor de Milhau, who had hired him to tutor her daughter in French, he left for Germany on August 21, 1901. Since the car averaged thirty kilometers an hour, it took them nine days to reach her villa on the Rhine, near Honnef. For the next year, Apollinaire tutored the daughter in the morning and (...) explored the picturesque area in the afternoon. Inspired by his new surroundings, he read voraciously and began to write a new kind of verse influenced by French Symbolism and German Romanticism. Apollinaire managed to combine a realistic form of lyric.. (shrink)

Including an edited transcription of a colloquium on Sander's life and work, this title contains plates selected from the J. Paul Getty Museum's collection. Sander's works exemplify the contradictory nature of early 20th century Germany.

The focus on deliberation as a central principle represents a common denominator between republican and deliberative theories of democracy (White, 2008, p. 9f). Both proponents of the ‘deliberative...

AimThe aim of our study was to analyze physical activity levels, sitting time, physical fitness, and their relationship with depressive symptoms after home confinement in previously active older adults.MethodsThis cross-sectional study sample comprised 68 older adults from a community-based exercise program conducted in Porto, Portugal. After home confinement, participants were assessed in person for lower-body strength, cardiorespiratory fitness, agility/dynamic balance, handgrip strength, and anthropometry. Telephone interviews were performed to evaluate depressive symptoms with the Geriatric Depression Scale – 15 items and (...) physical activity levels through the International Physical Activity Questionnaire. Individuals were also asked to self-report changes in their physical activity levels and time spent sitting.ResultsNinety percent of older adults self-reported a decrease in overall physical activity levels, and nearly 65% increased daily sitting time during the home confinement. However, previously active older adults still presented high levels of physical fitness after 11 weeks of home confinement. Overall, 52.9% of participants scored 5 or more points on GDS-15, which is suggestive of depression. Higher levels of moderate-to-vigorous physical activity and cardiorespiratory fitness were found in the non-depressed group compared with the depressed group. Finally, results from multiple regression analysis revealed that MVPA was negatively associated with depression. This model explained 16.4% of the variability seen in depression score, controlled for age, gender, and education.ConclusionEven reporting a decline in physical activity, older adults who previously participated in a formal exercise program, still presented high levels of physical fitness after 11 weeks of home confinement. However, MVPA, but not physical fitness, seems to be an associated depression score in previously active older adults. These results reinforce the importance of older adults to remain physically active, since higher levels of MVPA may have a protective effect on depressive symptoms and, therefore, mitigate the negative impact of home confinement on mental health. Future longitudinal research studies are needed to ascertain these results. (shrink)

This article consists of a report submitted to the Massachusetts Commissioner of Mental Health in 1981 from the members of a citizens task force convened for the purpose of recommending policy to the Department in matters concerning privacy and human sexuality. The Chairman of the Committee was given responsibility for producing the information and resources necessary for the members to debate the issue with some intelligence, of facilitating the process and the deliberations, and of writing the final recommendations and report (...) contained in this article.The need for policy in the areas of privacy and human sexuality for persons living in our state institutions serving the handicapped is a continuing and critical one. Resolution of the issues requires informed, courageous decision making by those who are responsible for the welfare of persons with mental or developmental deficiencies. The policy suggested in this article may serve as a step forward for those decision makers. (shrink)

Those who accept the necessity of mereological universalism face what has come to be known as the ‘junk argument’ due to Bohn [2009], which proceeds from the incompatibility of junk with universalism and the possibility of junk, to conclude that mereological universalism isn't metaphysically necessary. Most attention has focused on ; however, recent authors have cast doubt on . This paper undertakes a defence of premise against three main objections. The first is a new objection to the effect that (...) Bohn's defence of that premise presupposes far too much. I show that one can defend premise from a much weaker set of assumptions. The second objection, due to Contessa [2012], is that those who accept unrestricted composition should only accept the existence of binary sums rather than infinitary fusions. I argue that this conception of unrestricted composition is problematic: it is in conflict with an intuitive remainder principle. The final objection is .. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Einar Bohn [AJP 2019] has proposed a version of panpsychism on which consciousness is fundamentally a property of pluralities of basic objects. I argue that this pluralized panpsychism is structurally similar to emergentism, and faces the problem of explaining how a plurality of basic objects could be a subject of experiences. Because of these issues, pluralized panpsychism is not a substantial improvement on orthodox panpsychism.

This paper formulates generalized versions of the general principle of relativity and of the principle of equivalence that can be applied to general abstract spaces. It is shown that when the principles are applied to the Hilbert space of a quantum particle, its law of coupling to electromagnetic fields is obtained. It is suggested to understand the Aharonov-Bohm effect in light of these principles, and the implications for some related foundational controversies are discussed.

Einar Bohn has argued that principles of composition must be contingent if gunky objects and junky worlds are both metaphysically possible. This paper critically examines such a case for contingentism about composition. I argue that weak mereological universalism, the principle that any two objects compose something, is consistent with the metaphysical possibility of both gunky objects and junky worlds. I further argue that, contra A. J. Cotnoir, the weak mereological universalist can accept a plausible mereological remainder axiom. The proponent (...) of contingent composition will have to look elsewhere for an argument in favor of his position. (shrink)

A possible world is a junky world if and only if each thing in it is a proper part. The possibility of junky worlds contradicts the principle of general fusion. Bohn (2009) argues for the possibility of junky worlds, Watson (2010) suggests that Bohn‘s arguments are flawed. This paper shows that the arguments of both authors leave much to be desired. First, relying on the classical results of Cantor, Zermelo, Fraenkel, and von Neumann, this paper proves the possibility (...) of junky worlds for certain weak set theories. Second, the paradox of Burali-Forti shows that according to the Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory ZF, junky worlds are possible. Finally, it is shown that set theories are not the only sources for designing plausible models of junky worlds: Topology (and possibly other "algebraic" mathematical theories) may be used to construct models of junky worlds. In sum, junkyness is a relatively widespread feature among possible worlds. (shrink)

There is a widespread practice of using evidence obtained from conceiving/imagining for establishing possibility claims. As a case study. I offer a critical reconstruction of an influential conceivability argument, Bohn’s (Philosophical Quarterly 59:193-201, 2009a, Analysis 70:296–298, 2009b, Analysis 70:296-298, 2010) argument for junk (there are proper parts forming wholes, but there is no whole that is not a proper part itself). The most influential scenario used by Bohn and his successors is purported to be junk but not ensured (...) to be junk. This finding calls for an explanation. I distinguish ways of conceiving/imagining that are insufficient to establish modal claims from positive conceiving/imagining, which is more promising. Positive conceiving/imagining often works by a partial structural isomorphy to its target, and it is sufficiently detailed. In order to be sufficiently detailed, it has to properly integrate theoretical considerations. I outline a concern about extant ways of conceiving/imagining junk: they do not yet include a metaphysical understanding of what it takes for there to be proper parts and wholes without a whole that is not a proper part itself, for instance in terms of a non-gerrymandered principle of composition. (shrink)

In this paper, a pre-assessment of the Byzantine era of Aigai will be presented. Besides the western Anatolian cities of Pergamum, Ephesus and Smyrna, Aigai is the only city which achieved to cope with the rough terrain among the Aspordenon Mountains north of Smyrna. This city located 17 km east of the Yeni Şakran town in the province Izmir, also known as Köseler castle due to its location on Mount Gün near the Köseler village in the province of Manisa, and (...) is one of the twelve cities within the Aeolian region mentioned by Herodotus. Thanks to the detailed studies by R. Bohn and C. Schuchhardt on inscriptions from Aigai, the city was first introduced to the academical world in 1889. Archaeological studies started in 2004 and were conducted by Prof. Dr. Ersin Doğer. While the archaeological and written sources about the history and civilization of pre-Byzantine Aigai are rather well-known, in this paper it will be attempted to give an overview of the scarce written sources about the Byzantine era and to evaluate them in the light of so-far unpublished architecture and small finds. Since 2004, area based excavations have been carried out in the necropolis of the city, at Demirkapı and the insula situated east of the Tiberius gate which are the entrance points of the city, in the Bouleuterion, Agora and Macellum to its east, in the cisterns nos. I and II and in the easternmost part of the acropolis. The residential areas, built by the last inhabitants of the region, the Byzantines, by using spolia of older buildings, are badly preserved. The architecture, which, due to its location on a hillside, has been harmed by landslides and torrents, but also by human destruction such as treasure hunts and stone borrowing, is very fragile. The only preserved architecture so far is a sacral building dated to the 12th or 13th century. Abundant pottery and glass small finds, together with some metal objects and coins, enable us to get an idea of the Byzantine era in Aigai and provide a foresight to further studies. (shrink)

In this paper, a pre-assessment of the Byzantine era of Aigai will be presented. Besides the western Anatolian cities of Pergamum, Ephesus and Smyrna, Aigai is the only city which achieved to cope with the rough terrain among the Aspordenon Mountains north of Smyrna. This city located 17 km east of the Yeni Şakran town in the province Izmir, also known as Köseler castle due to its location on Mount Gün near the Köseler village in the province of Manisa, and (...) is one of the twelve cities within the Aeolian region mentioned by Herodotus. Thanks to the detailed studies by R. Bohn and C. Schuchhardt on inscriptions from Aigai, the city was first introduced to the academical world in 1889. Archaeological studies started in 2004 and were conducted by Prof. Dr. Ersin Doğer. While the archaeological and written sources about the history and civilization of pre-Byzantine Aigai are rather well-known, in this paper it will be attempted to give an overview of the scarce written sources about the Byzantine era and to evaluate them in the light of so-far unpublished architecture and small finds. Since 2004, area based excavations have been carried out in the necropolis of the city, at Demirkapı and the insula situated east of the Tiberius gate which are the entrance points of the city, in the Bouleuterion, Agora and Macellum to its east, in the cisterns nos. I and II and in the easternmost part of the acropolis. The residential areas, built by the last inhabitants of the region, the Byzantines, by using spolia of older buildings, are badly preserved. The architecture, which, due to its location on a hillside, has been harmed by landslides and torrents, but also by human destruction such as treasure hunts and stone borrowing, is very fragile. The only preserved architecture so far is a sacral building dated to the 12th or 13th century. Abundant pottery and glass small finds, together with some metal objects and coins, enable us to get an idea of the Byzantine era in Aigai and provide a foresight to further studies. (shrink)

Einstein's principle that no signal travels faster than light suggests that observations in one spacetime region should not depend on whether or not a radioactive decay is detected in a spacelike-separated region. This locality property is incompatible with the predictions of quantum theory, and this incompatibility holds independently of the questions of realism, objective reality, and hidden variables. It holds both in the pragmatic quantum theory of Bohr and in realistic frameworks. It is shown here to hold in a completed (...) realistic quantum theory that reconciles Einstein's demand for a description of reality itself with Bohr's contention that quantum theory is complete. This completed realistic quantum theory has no hidden variables, and no objective reality in which observable attributes can become definite independently of observers. The theory is described in some detail, with particular attention to those aspects related to the question of locality. This completed realistic quantum theory is in principle more comprehensive than Bohn's pragmatic quantum theory because it is not limited in principle by the requirement that the observed system be physically separated from the observing one. Applications are discussed. (shrink)

I exploit parallel considerations in the philosophy of mind and metaethics to argue that the reasoning employed in an important argument for panpsychism overgeneralizes to support an analogous position in metaethics: panmoralism. Next, I raise a number of problems for panmoralism and thereby build a case for taking the metaethical parallel to be a reductio ad absurdum of the argument for panpsychism. Finally, I contrast panmoralism with a position recently defended by Einar Duenger Bohn and argue that the two (...) suffer from similar problems. I conclude by drawing some general lessons for panpsychism. (shrink)

In the The Undivided Universe, David Bohn and Basil Hiley present a radically different approach to quantum theory.

Marjorie Perloff, among our foremost critics of twentieth-century poetry, argues that Ludwig Wittgenstein provided writers with a radical new aesthetic, a key to recognizing the inescapable strangeness of ordinary language. Taking seriously Wittgenstein's remark that "philosophy ought really to be written only as a form of poetry," Perloff begins by discussing Wittgenstein the "poet." What we learn is that the poetics of everyday life is anything but banal. "This book has the lucidity and the intelligence we have come to expect (...) from Marjorie Perloff.—Linda Munk, _American Literature_ "[Perloff] has brilliantly adapted Wittgenstein's conception of meaning and use to an analysis of contemporary language poetry."—Linda Voris, _Boston Review_ "_Wittgenstein's Ladder_ offers significant insights into the current state of poetry, literature, and literary study. Perloff emphasizes the vitality of reading and thinking about poetry, and the absolute necessity of pushing against the boundaries that define and limit our worlds."—David Clippinger, _Chicago Review_ "Majorie Perloff has done more to illuminate our understanding of twentieth century poetic language than perhaps any other critic.... Entertaining, witty, and above all highly original."—Willard Bohn, _Sub-Stance_. (shrink)

The thesis of Weak Unrestricted Composition says that every pair of objects has a fusion. This thesis has been argued by Contessa and Smith to be compatible with the world being junky and hence to evade an argument against the necessity of Strong Unrestricted Composition proposed by Bohn. However, neither Weak Unrestricted Composition alone nor the different variants of it that have been proposed in the literature can provide us with a satisfying answer to the special composition question, or (...) so we will argue. We will then go on to explore an alternative family of purely mereological rules in the vicinity of Weak Unrestricted Composition, Cardinal Composition: A plurality of pairwise non-overlapping objects composes an object iff the objects in the plurality are of cardinality smaller than $$\kappa $$ κ. As we will show, all the instances for infinite $$\kappa $$ κ s determine fusion and are compatible with junk, and every instance for a $$\kappa > \aleph _0$$ κ > ℵ 0 is furthermore compatible with gunk and dense chains of parthood. (shrink)

Marjorie Perloff, among our foremost critics of twentieth-century poetry, argues that Ludwig Wittgenstein provided writers with a radical new aesthetic, a key to recognizing the inescapable strangeness of ordinary language. Taking seriously Wittgenstein's remark that "philosophy ought really to be written only as a form of poetry," Perloff begins by discussing Wittgenstein the "poet." What we learn is that the poetics of everyday life is anything but banal. "This book has the lucidity and the intelligence we have come to expect (...) from Marjorie Perloff.--Linda Munk, American Literature "[Perloff] has brilliantly adapted Wittgenstein's conception of meaning and use to an analysis of contemporary language poetry."--Linda Voris, Boston Review " Wittgenstein's Ladder offers significant insights into the current state of poetry, literature, and literary study. Perloff emphasizes the vitality of reading and thinking about poetry, and the absolute necessity of pushing against the boundaries that define and limit our worlds."--David Clippinger, Chicago Review "Majorie Perloff has done more to illuminate our understanding of twentieth century poetic language than perhaps any other critic. . . . Entertaining, witty, and above all highly original."--Willard Bohn, Sub-Stance. (shrink)

Sergei Eisenstein’s 110th anniversary celebrated in 2008 calls for a re-assessment of his overall heritage, which until now has been customarily perceived in Western film scholarship as - in Annette Michelson’s words - ’indissolubly linked to the project of construction of socialism’ - a view shared from Marie Seton to Jacques Aumont, from Kristin Thompson to Ian Christie and from David Bordwell to Anna Bohn. Not only did Eisenstein’s output magnificently and persuasively outlive this project, but from our vantage (...) point at the beginning of the twenty- first century we can see its position within the complex tapestry of the cultural, philosophical, political and aesthetic developments of the twentieth century from a different angle. Drawing on the recently published in Russia Eisenstein’s magnum opus Method and the author’s research on still unpublished Eisenstein’s writings of the same period, including his diaries, the present paper positions the discussion of Eisenstein’s theory-and-practice between two diametrically opposed philosophical poles - utopia and event. I argue that while Eisenstein’s theoretical writings were encompassed by a number of utopian ideas, which were, nevertheless quite different from the utopian projects of bolshevism, it is his cinematography, which now - in the context of an on-going discussion in continental philosophy - can be defined as ’cinema of event’ that demonstrates the biggest and radical discrepancy between Eisenstein’s work and both ideology and art of socialism - the world of ‘realized utopia.’ . (shrink)